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ABSTRACT
Location-sharing services such as Facebook and
Foursquare/Swarm have become increasingly popular,
due to the ease at which users can share their locations, and
participate in services, games and other applications that
leverage these locations. But it is important for people who
use these services to configure appropriate location-privacy
preferences so that they can control to whom they want
to share their location information. Manually configuring
these preferences may be burdensome and confusing, and so
location-privacy preference recommenders based on crowd-
sourcing preferences from other users have been proposed.
Whether people will accept the recommended preferences
acquired from other users, who they may not know or trust,
has not, however, been investigated.
In this paper, we present a user experiment (n=99) to ex-
plore what factors influence people’s acceptance of location-
privacy preference recommenders. We find that 44% of
our participants have privacy concerns about such recom-
menders. These concerns are shown to have a negative effect
(p <0.001) on their acceptance of the recommendations and
their satisfaction about their choices. Furthermore, users’ ac-
ceptance of recommenders varies according to both context
and recommendations being made. Our findings are poten-
tially useful to designers of location-sharing services and pri-
vacy recommenders.
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INTRODUCTION
With the help of social networking sites, location-based ser-
vices, and smartphones, location-sharing services (LSSs),
such as Foursquare/Swarm and Facebook’s location check-in
mechanism, have been evolving rapidly in recent years. Peo-
ple can now easily share their whereabouts with others, in-
cluding their families, friends, and even the public, intention-
ally or unexpectedly. On the one hand, LSSs provide us with
convenient features such as personal tracking and discovery
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of new friends [19]. On the other hand, location-privacy pref-
erences are highly context-aware [1]; sharing information de-
pends on where they are and when they are in a certain place.
Such context-awareness makes the self-configuration of pri-
vacy preferences a complex task [9], which may lead to a
failure to protect location privacy [20]. Since people treat
their location as the most valuable type of personal informa-
tion [26], the lack of usable location-privacy protection mech-
anisms may affect the adoption of LSSs. To address these
usability and information overload issues, recommenders
have been designed to configure location-privacy preferences
(semi-)automatically, for instance by recommending prefer-
ences based on crowdsourced results (e.g. from people with
similar preferences). But people’s acceptance of these recom-
menders and the factors that influence their acceptance have
not been investigated sufficiently.
Existing research has mainly focussed on the measurement
of metrics, such as the recommendation accuracy, by con-
ducting offline recommender evaluation (i.e. using previously
collected user data to construct and test a recommender). But
location-privacy preferences are a relatively sensitive domain,
compared with other fields where recommenders are used,
such as music and movie recommendations, and so poor rec-
ommendations could have more serious consequences. Thus
simply measuring accuracy may be insufficient. We also need
to consider whether people accept these recommenders, or
indeed the recommendations made by them. Such accep-
tance might be affected by subjective factors such as a per-
son’s concerns about sharing their preference data with a rec-
ommender, and as well as objective factors such as how the
recommendations are made, or the type of recommendation
being made. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the in-
fluence of both people’s subjective factors and these objective
factors concerned with the recommender. Understanding this
will help us decide which factors we should take into account
when designing our recommenders.
In this paper we investigate the following research questions:
• Q1. Which subjective factors (e.g. trust in technology,
privacy concerns, and perceived quality) will influence a
person’s acceptance of location-privacy preference recom-
mendations?
• Q2. Which objective factors of recommendations (e.g.
context and openness) will influence people’s acceptance
of location-privacy preference recommendations?
The contributions of our work are as follows:
• Using an online user study (n=99), we find that people
do indeed have concerns about using recommenders for
privacy-preference prediction. These concerns have a neg-
ative influence on their perceived recommendation quality,
satisfaction about their choices, and acceptance of the rec-
ommendations.
• The openness of a recommendation (with whom the rec-
ommender is proposing to share location) has a significant
influence on people’s acceptance. Recommendations with
the highest and lowest openness are both less likely to be
accepted.
• Context (specifically time and location) has an effect on
people’s acceptance of location-privacy preference recom-
mendations.
We believe that our findings are of use to system designers
who wish to use recommenders for configuring preferences
about sensitive data.
RELATED WORK
To address usability issues in privacy protection, various
machine learning classifiers have been used to predict pri-
vacy preferences in online social networks [8, 22, 7] and in
LSSs [25, 2], thereby helping people to configure their pri-
vacy rules (semi-)automatically. These methods learn from
individual users’ previous privacy decisions and make pre-
dictions based on the models that they build. Experimental
results demonstrate that these methods can achieve high pre-
diction accuracy.
An alternative approach is to use crowdsourcing knowledge
to make recommendations for privacy preferences, such as se-
curity configurations on mobile devices [12, 15] and location-
sharing preferences [28, 29]. Compared with learning from
individual histories, crowdsourcing recommenders learn from
the “Wisdom of Crowds”. For example, Toch’s Super-Ego
framework makes predictions based on semantic analysis of
locations and the crowdsourcing results in the same semantic
categories [27]. In addition, context-aware recommenders [3]
based on collaborative filtering (CF) are also used, in which
the location and time are treated as contexts and the recom-
mendations are location-sharing preferences. For instance,
Xie et al. combine both user-based and item-based CF in
a recommender to make location-sharing preference recom-
mendations [28]. They show that crowdsourcing methods can
perform as well as machine learning classifiers. Furthermore,
such CF recommenders can be used to bootstrap new systems,
as they perform particularly well when there are insufficient
training data [29].
Research has shown that people’s security and privacy be-
haviours can be affected by social influence [6]. People often
trust inaccurate recommendations more than they should [11].
Given that privacy-preference is a sensitive domain, it is im-
portant to investigate what factors would influence people’s
perception on the recommendations and their interactions
with the recommenders. Knijnenburg and Jin [17] show that
privacy recommendations for location sharing services have
a strong persuasive effect on people. We extend their work
by exploring what kind of factors from both the recommen-
dations (e.g. source of crowdsourcing and level of openness
of recommendations) and the users (e.g. their concerns and
perceived recommendation quality) can influence the users’
acceptance of the recommendations.
Models and frameworks have been proposed to investigate
the effects from other factors beyond recommendation accu-
racy (e.g. personal characteristics, perceived quality, trans-
parency) in what is referred to as HRI (Human-Recommender
Interaction) [21]. For example, Zins and Bauernfeind inves-
tigate which factors influence users’ satisfaction with rec-
ommenders [30]. Their user study mainly focuses on ef-
fects from personal characteristics including Internet exper-
tise, product involvement, and Internet purchase attitudes. By
applying their model they find that these personal character-
istics can influence people’s experience when using online
recommenders. Pu et al. propose a framework to evaluate
recommenders from users’ perspectives. They consider a va-
riety of criteria including perceived system qualities, beliefs
and attitudes, but do not take into account the influence from
the recommender itself [23]. Compared with other existing
frameworks, the user-centric evaluation framework proposed
by Knijnenburg et al. [18] provides a structured model that
covers all the factors in which we are interested, including
both the objective factors of the recommender, as well as peo-
ple’s perception, experience and interaction, and personal and
situational characteristics. We choose to use this framework,
as described in the next section.
METHODOLOGY
Our goal is to investigate the effects of different factors on
people’s acceptance of location-privacy preference recom-
mendations. To do this, we have designed an experiment
based on the framework [18], which allows us to explore the
relationships between various objective and subjective factors
and the participants’ acceptance.
User-centric evaluation of recommenders
In HRI, the evaluation of recommenders not only takes into
account the objective factors (e.g. recommendation accuracy)
but also the evaluation from the users’ point of view (e.g. how
good do the users think the recommender is). To study this,
a valid framework is needed to precisely describe the factors
of the evaluation by the users and build the relationships be-
tween these two parts. Knijnenburg et al. [18] have proposed
a framework for such user-centric evaluation. The framework
provides a way to measure the influences of the objective fac-
tors on the users’ behaviours in HRI and these influences are
considered to be moderated by users’ subjective factors.
In this framework, a recommender is defined as a set of
Objective System Aspects (OSA) that relate to the underly-
ing recommendation algorithms and graphical user interfaces.
OSAs influence the users’ perception (e.g. perceived quality
of the recommendations) of the recommender. To describe
the users’ subjective factors in the framework, their percep-
tion is defined through a set of Subjective System Aspects
(SSA), which have influence on their Experience (EXP) (e.g.
their satisfaction about their choices) and Interaction (INT)
(e.g. purchasing the recommended products). The SSA is
used as the moderators for the OSA’s influence on EXP and
INT, which means the influence from OSA to EXP and INT
is through SSA. The effects from the Situational Characteris-
tics (SC) such as users’ privacy concerns and from their Per-
sonal Characteristics (PC) such as demographics and domain
knowledge to EXP and INT are also considered in this frame-
work.
To apply this framework to location-privacy preference rec-
ommendations, we measure the following factors that might
have an effect on acceptance of recommendations:
• trust: participants’ general trust in technology.
• quality: participants’ perceived quality of the recom-
mended location-privacy preferences.
• satisfaction: participants’ satisfaction about their chosen
recommendations in the second part of experiment.
• concern: participants’ privacy concern about using
location-privacy preference recommenders.
Specifically we consider trust as PC, quality as SSA, satisfac-
tion as EXP, and concern as SC. We use the different sources
of crowdsourcing recommendations as conditions, i.e. OSA
in the framework. We also introduce the participants’ ac-
ceptance of the location-privacy preference recommendations
into our model as an INT:
• acceptance: the percentage of the accepted location-
privacy preference recommendations of a participant.
Figure 1. Diagram of the framework for the user-centric evaluation of
recommenders as used in our experiment.
Figure 1 shows a diagram of how we apply this framework
to privacy-preference recommenders.
Questionnaires
To evaluate the subjective factors in our experiment, we draw
on the questionnaires provided by the framework [18]. To
measure the above listed factors, we use the following ques-
tionnaires: General trust in technology, Perceived recommen-
dation quality, Choice satisfaction, and System-specific pri-
vacy concern respectively. Each of these questionnaires con-
tain several questions, each of which refers to a question item,
measured on a five-point Likert scale from Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We hypothesise that people’s acceptance of location-privacy
preference recommendations change with different crowd-
sourcing sources, recommendations with different level of
openness, and different contexts (i.e. location category and
time). To test this, we conducted an experiment where peo-
ple used three different location-privacy preference recom-
menders, and then studied which factors had an influence on
their acceptance of the recommended location-privacy pref-
erences.
Participants were invited to login with their Facebook ac-
counts to our experimental system, so that our recommenders
could use their real-world Facebook logins to generate rec-
ommendations. They were then provided with a prebrief-
ing explaining the various recommenders, and how these rec-
ommenders could help with configuring privacy preferences.
Next, they were presented with a series of recommendations
about locations that existed in their Facebook location check-
in histories (as shown in Figure 2). Each recommendation
was presented as if it had been made using a particular source
of data. For instance, in Figure 2 we see a recommenda-
tion that was generated using information from a partici-
pant’s Facebook friends (in actual fact all recomendations
were made randomly, so as to maintain objective accuracy
without having it influence quality, satisfaction, or accep-
tance). Finally, participants were asked to complete a series
of questionnaires about their perceived quality of the recom-
mendations, their satisfaction, and system-specific concerns
(as shown in Figure 3).
To recruit participants, we advertised our experiment through
university mail lists and Facebook groups (to avoid biasing
the samples, we used “location-sharing preference” instead
of “location-privacy preference” in our experiment and ad-
vertisements). 164 participants tried to access our experi-
ment and 99 of them had at least 10 distinct location check-in
histories on their Facebook and completed the experiment.
Each participant who completed the experiment received a
£5 Amazon voucher for their participation. The study design
was scrutinised and approved by our institutional ethics com-
mittee.
Prebriefing
Our prebriefing explained the various recommenders, which
were:
• same-location recommender: using the preferences of peo-
ple who have been to the same location;
• similar-people recommender: using the preferences of
people who have similar previous location-sharing prefer-
ences;
• Facebook-friends recommender: using the preferences of
people’s Facebook friends.
Participants were provided with three examples to familiarise
themselves with the recommenders, and a quiz was used to
ensure that they understood the concepts. After successfully
completing the quiz, participants were asked to login with
their Facebook accounts using the PRISONER platform that
has been designed for privacy-sensitive social media experi-
ments [14]. This ensured that we would only collect the min-
imum amount of data required for our purposes. To make
our proposed recommenders look realistic, we asked for ad-
ditional permissions such as a Facebook friends list, even
though this was not needed.
To guarantee that we had enough data to generate recommen-
dations, only participants with more than ten distinct location
check-ins could proceed to the next part of the experiment.
Exploring recommendations
The purpose of the second part of our experiment was to
measure the participants’ acceptance of the recommended
location-privacy preferences. Firstly, participants were asked
about their demographic information including age and gen-
der. Then we used a questionnaire to measure trust, one of the
subjective factors in our experiment. The other questionnaires
about quality, satisfaction, and concern were shown after the
participants went through all the recommendations because
we want to know whether these factors would be influenced
after the participants using different recommenders.
Conditions were altered on a within-subjects basis. Each par-
ticipant was presented with 30 location-privacy preference
recommendations (10 for each recommender). For each rec-
ommender, we randomly selected 10 location check-ins from
the participant’s Facebook data as the contexts of the recom-
mendations. For each recommendation (Figure 2), the partic-
ipant was provided with the context of their previous check-
in, a map of the location of this check-in, and the recom-
mended preference from one of our recommenders. The con-
text contained the name of the location and the time slot (i.e.
morning, noon, afternoon, evening, or night) of the check-in.
The recommended preference (i.e. with whom the check-in
was shared) is randomly selected among Only Me, Friends,
Friends of friends, and Public. For each recommendation,
we asked the participants if they would like to use the rec-
ommended preference in the future visit to the place at the
certain time. To collect more realistic decisions about the
recommendations, we have used real check-in data to make
recommendations rather than using locations they have never
visited.
Final questionnaires
In the third part of the experiment, we collected data on
the participants’ subjective factors when using our recom-
menders; specifically we collected data on quality, satisfac-
tion, and concern. Participants were presented with seven
questionnaires. The first six evaluated the quality and sat-
isfaction of the various recommenders. When answering
the questionnaires for a particular recommender, participants
were shown with their choices to the recommendations from
this recommender made in the second part of the experi-
ment, to remind them with their decisions (Figure 3). One
final questionnaire measured overall concern with the recom-
menders.
After answering all the questionnaires, in the last step, partici-
pants were given opportunities to provide free-text comments
of their opinions and suggestions about our recommenders.
RESULTS
99 participants completed our experiment. Table 2 shows
their demographic information.
Table 1. Demographic Information
Category Options Participants(%) Facebook(%)
Gender
Female 63 51
Male 37 49
Age
18-24 74 21
25-34 24 27
35-44 2 20
45-54 0 16
55+ 0 16
Table 2. The demographics of our experiment (Participants) compared
with the overall UK Facebook over-18 user population (Facebook). The
Facebook data were taken from the Facebook Adverts Manager in Oc-
tober 2015.
Overall, we find a negative effect of concern on acceptance.
For the objective factors of recommendations, the level of
openness of the recommended location-privacy preferences
and the contexts of the recommendation both influence peo-
ple’s acceptance. The source of crowdsourcing does not in-
fluence their acceptance significantly.
Analytical approaches
In our study, we consider trust, quality, satisfaction, and con-
cern as the subjective factors. Each of these factors is evalu-
ated using various question items in the questionnaires. Be-
fore we evaluate their effects on acceptance, we need to first
establish their validity. We do this using Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (CFA), which can establish both convergent and dis-
criminant validity. Convergent validity ensures that the ques-
tion items in the same questionnaire measure the same factor,
while discriminant validity ensures that two different ques-
tionnaires measure two different factors. To maintain conver-
gent validity, question items with low loadings (i.e. the R2
value) may be removed until the average variance extracted
(AVE1) from each factor is larger than 0.5. To maintain dis-
criminant validity, if two factors are highly correlated, one of
them will be removed. By applying CFA we can refine the
answers to our questionnaires and increase the validity of the
factors in our experiment.
To find out whether there are effects between different factors,
we need to propose several hypotheses about these effects and
test them to discover significant effects. Structural Equation
Modeling (SEM) is an integrative modeling technique that
tests all proposed hypotheses simultaneously. By applying
SEM, we can combine and analyse the detected effects in an
integrative structure that allows us to link all the detected ef-
fects together. In our experiment, we use Lavaan [24] to im-
plement both the CFA and SEM analyses.
Privacy concerns lower acceptance of recommendations
We are interested in the effects of concern, trust, and condi-
tions on quality, satisfaction, and acceptance.
1The AVE for a given factor is the average of the R2 values of the
factor’s question items.
Figure 2. Each participant in our experiment was presented with 30 recommendations made by our 3 recommenders (10 recommendations from each
recommender), and asked if they would accept the recommendation.
Figure 3. Questionnaires were used to collect data on perceived recommendation quality (quality), satisfaction of choices (satisfaction), and concerns
about our system (concern). Participants were also presented with their choices as a reminder.
Construct Question items R2 AVE
Quality
I like the location-sharing choices that were made by the system. 0.858
The recommendations fitted my location-privacy preferences. 0.789
The recommended location-sharing choices were well-chosen. 0.822
The recommended location-sharing choices were relevant. 0.440
The system recommended too many bad location-sharing choices. 0.469
I didn’t like any of the recommended location-sharing choices. 0.328
The recommendations I accepted were “the best among the worst”. 0.321 0.575
Satisfaction
I like the recommendations that I’ve accepted. 0.510
Some of my chosen location-sharing choices could become part of my default
location-privacy settings. 0.506
I would recommend some of the chosen location-sharing choices to others/friends. 0.544 0.520
Concern
I’m afraid that the system discloses private information about me. 0.470
The system invades my privacy. 0.861
I feel confident that the system respects my privacy. 0.586
I’m uncomfortable providing private data to the system. 0.524
I think the system respects the confidentiality of my data. 0.571 0.602
Table 3. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Question items with low R2 values are removed in the refined results. The general trust to
technology (trust) is removed because it only has two question items to keep its AVE greater than 0.5. Both the convergent validity and the discriminant
validity of our model hold.
Table 3 shows the refined results of CFA after eliminating
low-loading question items. Trust only has two question
items to make its AVE larger than 0.5 and so it is eliminated
from our later SEM analysis, as each factor needs at least 3
question items. Our model’s convergent validity holds be-
cause the AVEs are greater than 0.5 and its discriminant va-
lidity holds too because all the correlations between two dif-
ferent factors are lower than the square roots of the AVEs of
both the factors.
After refining the factors, we apply SEM to our refined fac-
tors by adding relationships between them. All answers to the
question items are modeled as ordinal variables. We use the
same-location recommender as the baseline condition and in-
troduce two dummy variables friends and similar to represent
the conditions of the Facebook-friends recommender and the
similar-people recommender.
To avoid missing any significant relationships in
the SEM model we analyse every possible rela-
tionship between factors: for quality, we study
quality ∼ concern+ similar+ f riends; for satisfaction, we
study satis f action ∼ concern+ similar+ f riends+ quality;
and for acceptance, we study acceptance ∼ concern +
quality + similar + f riends + satis f action.2 The fit3
of our SEM model is adequate: χ2125 = 483.67, p <
0.001;root mean squared error o f approximation (RMSEA)=
0.098; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.977; Turker −
Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.972.
Figure 4 shows four significant (p < 0.001) effects in our
SEM analysis. Concern (SC) has a negative effect on both
the quality (SSA) and the satisfaction (EXP), which means
2Trust was eliminated at the CFA stage.
3The cut-off values of good fit proposed by Hu and Bentler [13]
are: CFI > 0.96,TLI > 0.95,RMSEA < 0.05. However, Kenny
et al. [16] recommend not computing the RMSEA for models with
small degree of freedom and small sample sizes.
that people with higher privacy concerns about our recom-
menders perceive lower quality of our recommendations and
are less satisfied about their choices. Quality acts as a medi-
ator between concern and acceptance (INT), influencing ac-
ceptance positively. Another positive effect is from quality to
satisfaction.
Our experimental results indicate that people’s privacy con-
cerns about location-privacy preference recommendations
play an important role when they use such recommenders.
We regress all of the “Neutral” answers in our concern ques-
tionnaire into a baseline concern and regress all of the par-
ticipants’ answers to their concern factors. We find that 44%
of these participants have higher concern than the baseline.
Their privacy concerns about using our recommenders have
a negative influence on their acceptance (mediated by their
perceived quality) and their satisfactions about their choices
(both directly related and mediated by their perceived qual-
ity). Location-privacy preferences are inherently sensitive be-
cause they contain both location information and people’s pri-
vacy settings (i.e. whether they share, and if so, to whom they
share the locations). Hence it is not surprising that concern
influences both acceptance and satisfaction.
We do not find significant effects from friends (OSA) or
similar (OSA) on quality, satisfaction, nor acceptance. In
other words, our participants do not perceive the qualities of
the recommended location-privacy preferences to be different
even when we claimed that they were made from different
crowdsourcing sources.
Openness and context affect acceptance
In addition to the conditions (i.e. the source of crowdsourc-
ing) that were controlled in our experiment, we consider other
factors that may influence participants’ acceptance of recom-
mendations. These include the level of openness of the rec-
ommended location-privacy preferences, and the contexts of
the recommendations.
Figure 4. The structured equation modeling (SEM) results. p <
0.001 for all coefficients. Numbers above arrows mean the β −
weight(±standard error) of the effect. Standard deviation = 1. The con-
cern has negative effects on acceptance (moderated by quality) and satis-
faction (directly and moderated by quality).
We evaluate the different acceptance of the recommended
preferences for different levels of openness (i.e. with whom
the recommender suggests a location is shared). Figure 5
shows the distribution of decisions for levels of openness
from very low (sharing with only myself) to high (sharing
with the public). The preference with the highest openness
has the lowest acceptance, which means people are less likely
to accept highly open location-privacy preference recommen-
dations. Nevertheless, the preference with the lowest open-
ness (sharing to only me) also has low acceptance. This
means that people not only consider privacy issues, but also
care about the benefits (e.g. social needs) from sharing their
locations. For example, one of our participants’ feedback in-
cludes:
• “... if i (sic) would only share something to ‘only me’, then
why would i (sic) share at all?”
When the benefits are guaranteed (i.e. sharing to someone),
the recommendations of low openness location-privacy pref-
erences get higher acceptance.
To study context, we manually analyse the categories given
by Facebook of all the locations in our recommendations
and merge similar categories with each other. By this
means, we have four categories: Entertainment, Residen-
tial, School/University/Library, and Transport. For the time
dimension, we use the five time slots from our previous
work [29]: morning (07:00–11:59), noon (12:00–13:59), af-
ternoon (14:00–16:59), evening (17:00–20:59), and night
(21:00–06:59).
Figure 6 shows that for different contexts, our participants
have different acceptance of the recommended location-
privacy preferences (two-way ANOVA to examine the in-
teraction effect of time and location: F = 2.039,d f =
12, p < 0.05). In all of the time slots, recommendations for
School/University/Library locations are most accepted. Since
we advertised our experiment through university mail lists
and university Facebook groups, we believe that the majority
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Figure 5. Distribution of all participants’ acceptance (the percentage of
accepted recommendations) of different recommended location-privacy
preferences (sharing to whom). The least open preference (only me) and
the most open preference (everyone) are least accepted. For the sharing-
preferences (i.e. friends, friends of friends, and everyone), the less open
preference is more accepted. (ANOVA: F = 33.45,d f = 3, p< 0.001)
of our participants are university students. This implies that
our participants accept our recommendations mostly in the
contexts where they conduct regular daily lives. The Trans-
port category experiences the lowest acceptance of recom-
mendations in the three time slots including morning, noon,
and afternoon. Comments made by participants may explain
this:
• “... for example, I was at the airport. This informs all Face-
book users that I will be away for potentially a longer pe-
riod of time than usual and could put myself at greater risk
of property theft etc. ...”
• “... I think a better recommender could consider sharing a
place by how regularly you go there or how far from where
you normally are it is ie how exotic it is.”
It appears that the regularity of contexts and the potential
risks caused by the false positive location-privacy preference
recommendations (i.e. sharing the locations which people do
not want to share) in different contexts have influences on
people’s acceptance. We plan to study these questions in fu-
ture research.
DISCUSSION
We find several effects from both objective and subjective
factors on people’s acceptance of location-privacy preference
recommendations in our user study. We combine these effects
together in Figure 7.
As shown in Figure 7, our aim is to design a system
where people have both high acceptance of the recommended
location-privacy preference and high satisfaction of their
choices. These are listed in the left box that represents users’
subjective factors. Since we cannot directly manipulate these
subjective factors, a system designer must measure the in-
fluential objective factors (the right box) and adjust recom-
mendation strategies to making recommendations that peo-
ple are more likely to accept. Our experimental results indi-
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Figure 6. Participants’ acceptance of the recommendations made for
different location categories. For each time slot, our participants have
the highest acceptance of recommended location-privacy preferences in
the School/University/Library category, which is the most regular context
for them (two-way ANOVA: F = 2.039,d f = 12, p< 0.05).
Figure 7. The effects of the subjective factors (left side) of users and
the objective factors (right side) of location-privacy preference recom-
mendations. The arrows in solid line mean the detected effects in our
experimental results. The dash line means a potential effect from an
unknown objective factor (marked as ?) to concern. Recommender sys-
tem designers can only control the objective factors on the right side to
influence the subjective factors on the left side.
cate that the contexts of the recommendations and the level of
openness of the recommendations, which can be measured by
recommender designers, will influence the acceptance. We
therefore suggest that these two factors should be taken into
account in the implementation of location-privacy preference
recommenders. In addition, we found the effect from the con-
cern on the left side, but we do not know the factors (marked
as ? in Figure 7) on the right side that can influence the con-
cern, which is our future work. We now discuss our recom-
mendations in further detail.
Be cautious about the level of openness
The first effect we find is the openness of the recommended
location privacy preferences. To our surprise, the lowest-
openness recommendations do not receive the highest accep-
tance. In fact, the acceptance of the lowest-openness rec-
ommendation is the second lowest and the highest-openness
recommendation has the lowest acceptance. This means that
people are not likely to give up the benefits of sharing their
locations for complete location-privacy, nor vice versa. This
suggests that location-privacy recommenders should be care-
ful with such extreme recommendations. When extreme rec-
ommendations are made, additional information, such as ex-
planations or request for consent, might be necessary to in-
crease people’s acceptance. Meanwhile, overexposing rec-
ommendations would decrease people’s acceptance. To avoid
this happening, enabling people to control the maximum
openness that they allow the recommender to make is also
a possible solution. This is supported by our participants’
feedback:
• “If the system had a ‘never share publicly’ option that
would work best for my preferences. ...”
• “There should be a ‘maximum exposure’ option ...”
In addition, customised recommendations that can provide
finer-grained openness might also be beneficial:
• “..., however I would like some more customization. ...”
• “The recommenders should take into account the prefer-
ences I’ve set in the past.”
• “Would need to learn a bit more about my own preferences
as well as aggregating those from other sources to be useful
for me.”
An outstanding research challenge for customisation is how
to make recommendations by using different types of cus-
tomised preferences because people may have different ways
to categorise and name the recipients of their location.
Recommendations should be context-aware
The second effect we find is from the contexts for the recom-
mendations. We observed that our participants have higher
acceptance of recommended location-privacy preferences in
their most regular context than others. Combined with our
post-experiment feedback, we postulate that the regularity of
and the potential risks (e.g. being away from home for a long
time) of overexposure in different contexts may also influence
people’s acceptance. In future work, we plan to investigate
these factors in more detail. But our current results imply
that system designers may wish to let users choose in which
contexts they want to use the recommender, or tune recom-
mendations to context. We also suggest that recommenders
in other domain such as mobile application recommendations
may be context-aware [3], since there are evidences from ex-
isting research [4] indicate that people’s mobile application
usage is highly dynamic with contexts
Recommenders must consider privacy and security
Our experimental results demonstrate that 44% of our partic-
ipants have privacy concerns when using our recommenders
and this concern has a negative effect on their acceptance of
the recommended location-privacy preferences and their sat-
isfactions about their choices. People may decide that provid-
ing their privacy preferences to a recommender is risky due to
its higher sensitivity than other preferences. This type of con-
cern is the concern in our experiment. Thus it is necessary
to implement location-privacy preference recommenders in a
privacy-aware fashion [29].
In addition to privacy, users may also be concerned about se-
curity. Recommenders are vulnerable to a series of attacks
due to their open structure. One example is the shilling at-
tack [10], which means the malicious users might be able to
inject fake profiles and preferences to influence the outcome.
Attacks may also be passive, such as the inference attack [5],
which means the attackers might be able to infer the location-
privacy preferences of certain target users by passively ob-
serving the change of the recommendations with the help of
some auxiliary information. Additional work is needed to
investigate whether these vulnerabilities would contribute to
people’s concerns and decrease their likelihood of contribut-
ing their data to the system. Accordingly, it is important to
find solutions to detect and alleviate these attacks.
LIMITATIONS
In our experiment, we find the effects from both the subjec-
tive and objective factors on people’s acceptance of location-
privacy preference recommendations. That said, we note
some limitations in our experiment that we hope to overcome
in our future work.
First, to ensure the participants were familiar with the con-
texts of the recommendations, for each participant, we only
used their own location check-in history as the contexts for
making recommendations. Compared with asking them to
consider the recommendations hypothetically in some places
they have never been, the answers through our method are
more likely to reflect their true decisions. This means, how-
ever, that we failed to evaluate their acceptance of the rec-
ommended location-privacy settings when they actually en-
ter new places. In future work, we hope to deploy our rec-
ommender in real world environments and evaluate people’s
acceptance of recommended location-privacy preferences in
situ.
A second limitation is that we used a random recommen-
dation generator rather than real recommenders. This was
done to keep the objective quality of the recommendations
the same for all participants, since the performance of real
recommendations for a specific user could be influenced by
the quality of their own preference. By using the same ran-
dom recommender for all participants, we could ensure that
all the changes we observed were due to the changes that we
controlled. As a consequence, the overall performance of the
recommendations was impacted inevitably. Since the source
of crowdsourcing was shown to not have an influence on
people’s acceptance when the recommenders have the same
performance, it would be useful to investigate which crowd-
sourcing source has the best objective performance when de-
ploying a system in the real world.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we conduct an online user experiment to inves-
tigate which objective and subjective factors influence peo-
ple’s acceptance of location-privacy preference recommenda-
tions. Our results show that the openness of the recommended
location-privacy preferences and the contexts of the recom-
mendations both have effects. Meanwhile, people’s privacy
concerns about using our recommenders have a negative in-
fluence on their acceptance of the recommended location-
privacy preferences and the satisfaction about their choices.
Compared with existing research focusing on the objective
performance (i.e. recommendation accuracy), our work sheds
light on the parameters that system designers might want to
control and the issues which need to solved when designing
location-privacy preference recommenders in order to make
them more acceptable to users.
Our future plans are to investigate solutions, both techni-
cal and social, for alleviating the security and privacy issues
that affect users’ concerns about privacy preference recom-
menders. We believe that this will result in systems that are
both technically better, and better accepted by users.
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